

Section G. Policy for Local War Posture and Strategy

The threat of local aggression confronts the United States with many difficult problems. The aggression itself could take any one of a great variety of forms. It could occur in one or more of a large number of areas, and under a wide range of geographic and climatic conditions. Its precise origins and objectives might be difficult to identify. The Soviet Union, Red China, or other members of the Communist Bloc might be involved directly or covertly. Aggression might even take place simultaneously in two or more parts of the world. Resistance to it might require concerted diplomatic and military action on the part of the U. S. and one or more of its Allies.

The U. S. regards the threat of local aggression as endangering its vital interests. It and its Allies must therefore be prepared to deter or, if necessary, to repel local aggression wherever and however such aggression may take place. The specific goals which the local war policy of the U. S. seeks to attain are:

1. The capability on the part of Allies and other members of the Free World to bear a large share of the burden of deterring and repelling local aggression.
2. The capability on the part of the U. S. to respond to local aggression locally, wherever it may occur and whatever form it may take. This capability will be designed so as to enable the U. S.:

a. To react swiftly and effectively to local aggression; to repel the aggressor; and where opportune, to recover territory lost in previous aggressions.

b. To place main but not sole reliance on non-nuclear weapons.

c. To fight in concert with Allies, but unilaterally if necessary.

d. To fight locally in direct conflict with the armed forces of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

e. Consistent with the achievement of military objectives, to limit damage within the theater of war, and to exercise special care in this regard when nuclear weapons are authorized for use.

f. To prevent or control the escalation of a local war.

g. To prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.

h. To achieve objectives as formulated by constituted political authority.

Fulfillment of these goals will be undertaken according to the following guidance:

1. With respect to U. S. force posture and deployment.

Force strengths of the U. S. and Allies should be maintained at a level adequate to deter or defeat aggression by the Communist Bloc without the use of nuclear weapons in those parts of the world where the U. S. has a logistical advantage. In less favorably located areas this strength should be sufficient to prevent a Communist take-over for long

ough to enable the U. S., if possible in concert with Allies, to take and execute such decisions for increasing the scope and intensity of the conflict as seem appropriate. At the present time the main basis for U. S. local war planning outside of Europe is the Korean Contingency Plan. The scale of conflict represented by this Plan, including the mobilization potential of reserve forces, remains the basis of U. S. local war planning for the present. Forces not assigned central war missions as their primary role will prepare and be deployed primarily for the conduct of non-nuclear local war. These forces will be equipped with the most advanced non-nuclear weapons and munitions.

Air and sea transport will be maintained and modernized for the rapid movement of forces to areas of existing or potential conflict. Materiel will be pre-stocked in selected areas overseas for the support of initial operations. Emphasis should be given to communications and reconnaissance capabilities for local war.

National Guard and Reserve personnel that are not assigned specific duties with respect to air defense of the U. S. will have as their primary mission preparation for local war. Strengths, equipment, and training should be such as to permit rapid mobilization and expeditious reinforcement of these forces. These units will have civil defense preparation as a secondary mission.

Strong special forces for counter-insurgency and for guerrilla operations should be regarded as a vital element in local war plans and

operations. Plans and the deployment of forces for combatting subversion and para-military aggression should take into account the consequences of escalation of the level of conflict by either side. Wherever possible and desirable the U. S. and its Allies should be prepared to commit large forces to a local area. This ability will not only help to deter a larger commitment by the other side but should help to influence the course of development of para-military operations.

Sizeable U. S. forces will be retained abroad in a high state of readiness. Where necessary, forces will be withdrawn from one overseas command to participate in or support actions initiated within another command or theater. Particularly in the case of Europe, where forces are withdrawn for action elsewhere, either they will return to their original overseas command at an early date, or they will be replaced in that command by units from the U. S.

2. With respect to nuclear weapons, The distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons will be carefully preserved, and the decision to use nuclear weapons will be taken only on high political authority or according to rules defined by such authority.

Nuclear-capable units will have the ability and the mission to support Allied as well as U. S. forces in local war. They will be organized and maintained so as to permit flexible target assignment. They will be located in such a way that they can be responsive to Allied as well as U. S.

authorized.

It remains the policy of the U. S. to use nuclear weapons if they should be required in order to fulfill the treaty obligations of the U. S. or to preserve vital national interests. Use of nuclear weapons, when authorized, will be with due regard for the several objectives of attaining military superiority over the enemy, limiting damage to the country or countries being defended, preserving Alliances, and avoiding accidents or unauthorized acts.

3. With respect to the conduct of local war.

At a minimum, the U. S. is prepared to provide assistance in the form of materiel, expert advice, and economic support to countries subject to any type of aggression by the Communist Bloc. In some circumstances it may be advantageous for the U. S. to intervene immediately and forcefully. U. S. forces will therefore be prepared for rapid and effective intervention at the outset of, or in anticipation of, an aggression.

Where U. S. and other allied military intervention occurs, the effort will be to keep the conflict at the non-nuclear level and locally confined, while successfully repelling the aggression.

The U. S. will also be prepared to use nuclear weapons in defense of the Free World, and will meet nuclear aggression with the appropriate nuclear response. Massive non-nuclear attack launched against vital areas that cannot be defeated at the non-nuclear level will meet a

nuclear response. This policy applies to the NATO area at a minimum.

Contingency plans for U. S. participation and assistance in possible local conflicts will estimate what objectives could be attained at various levels of effort on the part of prospective enemies, allies, and the U. S. Nuclear annexes will be appended indicating U. S. targets and weapons assignments. They will also indicate the consequences of limited use by the Sino-Soviet Bloc of nuclear weapons on the ability of our own forces to engage in local war.

It might not prove possible in some instances to deter or defeat local aggression without being prepared to increase the U. S. commitment. Under existing conditions, which are marked by the cold war and occasional outbreaks of violence, the U. S. must give particular evidence of its determination to defend the Free World. Therefore, in order to deter local aggression, to exercise control over the escalation of a local war and to deter the enemy from increasing his commitment, plans and preparations will be made for a possible grave crisis including:

- a. Mobilizing manpower and economic resources; increasing the defense budget.
- b. Shifting or expanding the area of conflict in such a way that U. S. and allied strengths can be more effectively applied.
- c. Engaging in harassing tactics within the Communist Bloc.
- d. Alerting and exercising the central war forces of the U. S.
- e. Augmenting intelligence collection.

facilities in areas friendly to the U. S. where base rights are not currently available and where bases and infrastructure are inadequate to the support of U. S. forces. These facilities would enable U. S. and allied forces to support friendly countries in the most expeditious manner possible in the event of crisis or war.

The U. S. will continue to work with friendly countries to develop and improve their facilities and infrastructure to the extent that it is feasible and desirable.

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Planning for U. S. participation in local wars should be based on the assumption that the forces available for non-nuclear, local conflict will be restricted to the active units, National Guard, and Reserve units of the Armed Forces. It is not the present policy of the U. S. to prepare for ^{local} conflict approaching the scale of World War II.

4. With respect to overseas bases.

Barring a radical change in the international situation, the U. S. will require the ability to make its power felt anywhere in the world. Therefore, it is in the continuing interest of the U. S. to retain a sizeable system of overseas bases and base rights, to deploy U. S. forces overseas, and to ensure maintenance of the infrastructure necessary for their support. Although the utility of overseas bases for central war is declining, their importance for the support of local war forces and operations remains great. Plans will therefore be drawn up for the acquisition and retention of a worldwide system of bases. These plans will provide the basis for future negotiation of base rights, as and when such negotiations are deemed expedient. Efforts will be made in advance to procure access to bases, use of bases, and overflight rights in connection with the widest possible range of contingencies. Overseas bases will also continue to be available for the performance of selected central war missions, and reconnaissance and intelligence functions.

It is in the interest of the U. S. to assist in the development of base

Section H. Policy for Alliances and Allied Capabilities

The alliances to which the U. S. is a party serve several purposes:

1. They represent clear evidence that the U. S. intends to participate in the defense of certain countries and regions. As such, they are guarantees.
2. They constitute an agreement whereby the defense of member countries and other designated nations is facilitated and shared.
3. They are institutions through which economic growth, political stability, and regional integration may be promoted.

The U. S. will continue to honor its obligations under the treaties to which it is a party. However, these obligations will not be regarded as necessarily constraining the U. S. from acting unilaterally to maintain its vital interests in any area of the world.

Nor will these obligations be regarded as barring the U. S. from accepting and supporting the neutrality of certain countries. It is the policy of the U. S. to form and support alliances insofar as they serve to increase the strength of the Free World and the assurance that it will be defended. Some countries are unsuited by location and internal problems to make an effective contribution to Free World strength. Provided that their neutrality is genuine, the U. S. will respect it and will contribute to their efforts to achieve economic growth and maintain national independence.

Where our allies are concerned, it seems unlikely in the near future that they will be able, either independently or collectively, to develop significant nuclear capabilities. Furthermore, the widespread diffusion of nuclear weapons could promote disunity, ^{in the Western Alliance,} divert resources from non-nuclear tasks, make nuclear escalation of local war more likely, increase the chance of accidents and unauthorized acts, and would almost certainly complicate the problem of controlling the course and character of a nuclear war if it did occur. It would also make arms control more difficult.

To the extent feasible, the U. S. will therefore continue to maintain and control the nuclear forces necessary to the defense of the Free World.

The U. S. should make it evident abroad that a policy of renouncing independent nuclear capabilities will be welcomed by the U. S. as a contribution to world stability. Where other countries possess or acquire nuclear weapons, they will be encouraged to place these weapons under bilateral or multilateral commands in which the U. S. would have a veto over their use and a major voice in the process of planning for their employment. U. S. nuclear weapons are required by law to remain under U. S. control in peacetime. Strict adherence to the law will remain unquestioned.

In the circumstances, the main contribution of the alliances to which the U. S. is a party will be regarded as that of repelling local aggression by non-nuclear means. Where necessary, the U. S. will supply the nuclear support required in a local war.

Since it is the policy of the U. S. to deter aggression, and to raise the threshold at which the use of nuclear weapons would be required in the event of war, our allies will be advised that their possession of substantial, ready, non-nuclear capabilities is regarded as vital to the U. S. as well as to themselves. They will also be advised that their voice in our counsels with the U. S. will be much more a function of their non-nuclear than of their nuclear capabilities. They will be encouraged to increase their non-nuclear capabilities, research and development to the extent that this is economically and politically feasible. The U. S. will support them in this enterprise. It will not assist them to acquire nuclear weapons under present circumstances.

NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization represents the alliance in which the U. S. sets the greatest store. The integrity and independence of Western Europe are of vital interest to the U. S. Western Europe has the resources to make a very large contribution to the defense of the Free World. The broad outlines of our military policy toward NATO are as follows:

1. First priority should be given, in NATO programs for the European area, to preparing for contingencies short of nuclear or massive non-nuclear attack.

2. NATO should also be prepared to meet nuclear and massive non-nuclear attack in the theater, but not to a degree that would divert

needed resources from non-nuclear programs for the defense of the theater, or from programs to assure an ample and protected U. S. central war capability.

3. The objectives of NATO's non-nuclear forces should be the containment of Soviet forces now in or rapidly deployable to Central Europe for a period sufficient to enable the Russians to appreciate the wider risks of the course on which they have embarked, and the defeat of any Soviet aggression of lesser size. The U. S. should also support the development of a mobile task force to help deal with threats to NATO's flanks.

4. U. S. ground forces will be retained in Europe at present strength for the foreseeable future. However, consistent with the primary importance of protecting the NATO area, certain of these forces may be required temporarily to undertake local military operations outside the European theater.

5. NATO non-nuclear/research and development and coordinated production will be encouraged, as will the further rationalization and integration of national defenses in the NATO area.

6. Nuclear weapons will be retained in Europe. Their composition, numbers, and siting will be changed in accordance with changing technology and NATO and Communist Bloc force structures.

7. Measures to improve the survivability, security, and responsiveness, of nuclear capabilities in Europe will be adopted.

8. So far as the U. S. is concerned, it is vital that the use of the

part of its nuclear power
that the part of that power deployed in Europe be free of veto. It is,
however, most important to the U. S. that the use of nuclear weapons
by the forces of other nations in Europe be subject to American veto and
control. Therefore, the concept of a veto by another than ourselves over
the nuclear forces located in the European theater is not contrary to our
interests.

9. Until such time as the North Atlantic Council has worked out
agreed guidelines concerning the use of nuclear weapons, the President
will make clear his readiness and intent to use them if NATO forces have
been subjected to nuclear attack or are about to be overwhelmed by non-
nuclear forces.

10. The U. S. is prepared to commit additional nuclear forces
based outside of Europe to NATO. Deployment and targeting of these
forces will be the duty of the responsible NATO commands.

11. In view of these commitments, the U. S. will discourage its
NATO allies from acquiring or retaining independent nuclear capabilities.
The U. S. should not facilitate European development or production of
advanced delivery systems primarily designed for nuclear weapons delivery.

Section I. Policy for Military Assistance Programs

The U. S. is vitally interested in promoting the economic growth,
political stability, and development of democratic institutions within the

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Free World. While fulfilling these goals it is necessary that the nations of the Free World be made secure both against internal subversion and external aggression. Security from these dangers is, in fact, a prerequisite to the attainment of longer-range economic and political objectives. It is desirable, moreover, for the nations of the Free World to be capable of deterring or thwarting both internal subversion and local aggression without the intervention of U. S. armed forces.

Some nations in danger of Communist aggression do not have the resources to maintain armed forces adequate to their needs and at the same time promote economic growth and political stability. Internal subversion may represent as great a problem to other members of the Free World as aggression from the outside. Still other nations may have military needs and aspirations of a different character. Allocations of resources to assist these countries must be determined in the full realization that no single nation on the periphery of the Communist Bloc could withstand, or hope to withstand, the full weight of Sino-Soviet military power. In some instances it may therefore be desirable to support smaller but more efficient forces than are currently being maintained. In other instances it may be important to concentrate on forces designed to uphold internal security, or on the means necessary to facilitate U. S. and allied military support. In determining the level of allied and indigenous forces to be supported, account should be taken of the utility of developing regions of strength around the Sino-Soviet periphery.

help offset inevitable weaknesses in other regions. The substantially lower cost of supporting indigenous forces as compared with U. S. forces should also be taken into account. In all instances it seems desirable to assist in the development of capabilities sufficient to make a potential enemy commit an overt act of aggression in order to achieve his ends.

Pending a review of current military assistance programs, their worth will be judged by their contribution to one or more of the following objectives:

1. The maintenance of armed forces at least adequate to provide initial strong resistance to armed aggression.
2. The maintenance of forces capable of achieving internal security through police operations, frontier guard, and counter-guerrilla activities.
3. The creation or maintenance of U. S. bases and base rights as well as the facilities to enable the U. S. and its allies to support an attacked country in the most expeditious possible manner.
4. The support of U. S. policies by the government and armed forces of the assisted country.
5. The prevention or reduction of dependence on Sino-Soviet assistance by the country being supported.

The U. S. will continue military assistance programs aimed at these objectives for the foreseeable future. Assistance will be confined (insofar as possible) to the support of non-nuclear capabilities and will be tailored to the specific security needs of each assisted country. It will not be used to enable other countries to develop strategic nuclear capabilities.

nor will the forces that are developed and maintained be regarded as having central war as their primary mission.

Programs will be administered with due regard for the multiplicity of U. S. interests in each of the assisted countries. Since political, economic, and security objectives are interdependent, the means for their achievement should be coordinated and made mutually reinforcing.

Section J. Policy for Intelligence and Para-Military Operations

Owing to the secrecy and deception practiced by the Communist Bloc, it remains especially important for the United States to continue and improve its intelligence operations. These operations will receive the full support of the government. Two areas in particular warrant determined efforts.

Because of the uncertainties surrounding Communist military research, development, and procurement it is of the utmost importance that national intelligence estimates concerning the future force structure and posture of the Communist Bloc - and especially the longer-range estimates - be based on the best possible intelligence collection programs and methods of analysis and estimation. Where necessary, they should also show not only single estimates, but also a range of alternatives in order to reflect the uncertainties which are necessarily inherent in such projections. The military plans and programs of the United States require both the admission of uncertainty and a reasoned estimate of its probable range.

In view of the dangers of local and central war, it is equally important that the intelligence operations of the U. S. be able to function in other than normal peacetime conditions. Particular attention will be given to:

1. Having personnel and equipment available on a standby basis for use in special collection efforts under conditions of extreme international tension. At all times, plans will be ready for employing this standby capability to refine and fill in gaps in our current knowledge.

2. Improving the capability of the intelligence community to survive, even in the most adverse conditions of combat, and continue operations.

Such improvements will include the protection of essential personnel and communications.

3. Developing plans and preparations for the special requirements generated by the wartime operation and control of U. S. forces. This should include preparations to take advantage of wartime opportunities to provide intelligence of importance to the security of the United States.

This guidance applies to both central and local war.

4. Preparing measures of cover and deception for use in wartime. Central war as well as local war contingencies will be analyzed in the preparation of these measures.

Para-military and covert capabilities will also receive increased support and additional resources. These techniques will be regarded as a normal and important part of the U. S. capability to deal with the efforts

of the Communist Bloc to expand its influence. Plans and preparations for such operations should not be confined to the activities of several individuals, nor to activities within the Free World only. They should include covert operations of substantially greater magnitude, and they should consider targets within the Communist Bloc as well as within the Free World.

Section K. Policy for Research and Development

Technology is dynamic and changes in it are difficult to predict. There will probably be surprising developments in the 1960's just as there certainly have been in the 1940's and 1950's. Moreover, owing to the rapid advance of Soviet technology, there is as great a likelihood that the Soviets will surprise us as that we will surprise them.

There is also great uncertainty about the size and composition of future Soviet military capabilities.

These factors, coupled with the possibility that other countries will acquire sophisticated nuclear weapons systems, make it essential that we hedge against uncertainty. We should be able to adapt our military posture to a variety of contingencies and we must keep open the options to do so.

Keeping options open means that we should start development programs in the full realization that changed and unforeseen circumstances

may make some of these programs unnecessary by the time they are completed. It means that we may have to cancel others even though substantial resources have been invested in them.

We should also procure a reduction in leadtime, being prepared to make decisions at an early date to buy production capabilities that we may never use. To the end of reducing both cost and lead time we should be prepared to place major development projects in the hands of competent individuals and to reduce to a minimum bureaucratic interference with the management of these projects.

In short, a substantial and diversified military research and development effort is clearly a necessity. It will be encouraged and supported.

This effort should include, as a high priority, support of research on basic physical phenomena which might be translated into new weapons for the armed forces. It should also include support of policy-oriented research designed to help us understand better how to achieve our security goals in a complex and changing world.

Section L. Policy for the Control and Reduction of Armaments

The maintenance of the security interests of the United States under present conditions requires that the United States and its Allies have at

their disposal armed forces sufficient to deter or defeat any aggression, whether it be directed against an Ally or against the United States itself, whether nuclear or non-nuclear weapons are employed. So long as the Communist Bloc continues its efforts to disrupt and subjugate the Free World, the retention of military power ample for these purposes will remain of the utmost importance. However, it is not in the interest of the United States, in retaining this power, to intensify the arms race. Nor is it in our interest to engage in disarmament or arms control simply to save money. The United States can afford and will spend whatever is required to maintain its security.

In the circumstances, certain principles apply to the U. S. approach to arms control and disarmament. - They are:

1. Agreements in this area are not to be regarded as a good in themselves. Arms control policy is to be considered as a means of securing the vital interests of the United States. Not only is it to be judged by the same criteria as defense policy, arms control policy and defense policy are identical.

2. Prospective agreements are to be scrutinized not only for their effect on the security of the United States, but also for their effect on the security of our Allies.

3. Tacit agreements will be regarded as having utility at least equal to formal agreements. Allowing for the secrecy of the Communist Bloc, where such tacit agreements appear to be in force, and contribute

to the security of the United States and its Allies, they will be observed. Additional tacit agreements that would prove advantageous will be sought.

4. Should circumstances change, and a world order emerge in which disputes could be settled equitably and without resort to force, the United States would be interested in the controlled reduction of armaments to a low level.

At the present time, the United States will continue to work toward arms reduction and control while maintaining a suitable defense posture. Where negotiations for the reduction of armament are not already in progress, the United States will prepare contingent positions for their eventuality. These preparations will take due account of evolving technology, the comparative risks of entering into various possible agreements and of not doing so. These preparations should also take account of the sanctions or other actions that would be available and useful in the event that such an agreement were violated or were to break down.

The reduction of armaments is a goal sought by the United States, provided that such reduction does not weaken the United States and its Allies relative to their prospective enemies. But this goal by no means precludes efforts at the control of existing and future armaments in such a way as to reduce the likelihood of wars inimical to the interests of the United States. Measures to diminish the probability of surprise attack, to prevent unauthorized military acts or accidents, and unpremeditated or

hasty actions - especially with nuclear weapons - are among those that will continue to receive high priority attention and analysis.

The importance of arms control is such that, pending the conclusion of satisfactory international agreements to this end, the United States unilaterally will take measures designed to reduce the vulnerability of its forces, to strengthen the ability of the highest national authority to exercise unhurried, deliberate, and flexible control over their use, and to discourage the diffusion of nuclear weapons and advanced delivery capabilities to other countries. Such measures will be regarded not only as increasing the national security, but also as important contributions to the control of armaments.